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Abstract
In his classic novel, Catch-22 (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly
frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II.  This is generalized to a
“generic” 2 x 2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player
chooses, the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or
next-worst outcome, and possibly vice versa.  The 12 specific games subsumed by the
generic game are called catch-22 games.  These games, along with 4 king-of-the-
mountain games, turn out to be the only games in which moving power is “effective,”
based on the “theory of moves” (TOM).
A generic “Mobilization Game” applicable to international crises, in which some
of the rules of play of TOM are modified, is used to divide the catch-22 games into three
mutually exclusive classes.  Predictions for each class are compared with the behavior of
decision makers in two Egyptian-Israeli crises.  In the 1960 Rotem crisis, Egypt retracted
its mobilization after a discreet countermobilization by Israel, which is consistent with
being in a class I game.  In the 1967 crisis, escalation moved up in stages from a class I to
a class II to a class III game, which precipitated war and is consistent with cycling in such
games.  It is argued that the catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games better model the
dynamics of conflict spirals than does the usual static representation of the security
dilemma as a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
JEL Classification:  C72, C73, D74.  Keywords:  Catch-22; escalation;
international crisis; security dilemma; theory of moves; cyclic games; moving power.To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize:  Catch-22s in International Crises1
1.  Introduction
In Joseph Heller’s classic novel, Catch-22, a World War II combat pilot faces the
following predicament:  “If he flew them [more missions] he was crazy and didn’t have
to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to” (Heller, 1961, p. 52).  Taking their
cue from this novel, Brams and Jones (1997) generalized the pilot’s predicament to a
class of situations they modeled by a “generic” 2 x 2 catch-22 game:  whatever strategy
the column player C chooses (c1 or c2), the best response of the row player R (r1 or r2)
inflicts on C a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice versa.2
More descriptively, the generic catch-22 game can be characterized by the
following four properties, based on the theory of moves, or TOM (Brams, 1994):
1.  Cyclicity.  The game is cyclic (Brams, 1994, ch. 4):  there is one and only one
direction—clockwise or counterclockwise—in which neither player, when it has the next
move, ever departs from its best outcome as the players alternately move and
countermove around the matrix.  Because each player must always move to try to attain
this outcome, cycling in this direction is rational.
2.  Frustration for C.  When it is R’s turn to move during this cycling (by
switching from r1 to r2 or from r2 to r1), these moves induce C’s two worst outcomes.  If
forced to choose between them, it is rational for C to choose its next-worst outcome (call
this outcome x).
                                          
1I thank Ben D. Mor for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper and
gratefully acknowledge the support of the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at
New York University.
2This, of course, is not the way dictionaries define a catch-22, but this game seems to
capture the spirit of being enmeshed by  “a supposed law or regulation containing
provisions which are mutually frustrating . . .; a set of circumstances in which one
requirement, etc., is dependent on another, which is in turn dependent upon the first”
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., 1989).2
3.  Incentive of R to Frustrate C.  R prefers x to either of the outcomes when it is
its turn to move, giving R an incentive always to move to try to attain x .
4.  Power of R to Frustrate C.  R has moving power—it can continue the move-
countermove process when C no longer has the wherewithal or the will to continue
moving and must, consequently, stop—forcing C to choose x .
Of the 57 distinct 2 x 2 strict ordinal games in which there is no mutually best outcome
(conflict games),3 36 are cyclic and 12 of these are catch-22s.  In 4 of these games, C can
also induce a catch-22 if it, rather than R, has moving power.
The catch-22 games illustrate how frustration can arise in a dynamic setting,
whereby players are free, according to TOM, to move and countermove from outcomes in
2 x 2 matrix games (as opposed to choosing strategies simultaneously, according to
standard game theory).  In sections 2 and 3, I describe the rules of play of TOM and
aspects of moving power that are relevant to the analysis of catch-22 and related games.
These are modified in section 4 to construct a model of mobilization decisions in
international crises.  In contrast to Brams and Jones (1997), I do not focus on the
frustration of persons—the antihero of Catch-22 and accused witches in medieval witch
trials—but on the dissatisfaction of nation-states (specifically, their leaders).  I posit a
state dissatisfied with the status quo (revisionist state, R) in conflict with a satisfied state
(status-quo state, S), whose leaders’ initial calculations run as follows:
• For R:  by mobilizing, I will be in a better position to change the status quo by (i)
  threatening to attack S or—if this is not successful—(ii) actually doing so.
• For S (in response to this threat):  by countermobilizing, I will be in a better
  position (i) to deter R from attacking me or (ii) to protect myself if attacked.
                                          
3If the 21 games with a mutually best outcome are included, there are a total of 78 distinct
2 x 2 strict ordinal games (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966).3
The so-called security dilemma shows that these calculations are too simple—they
do not take into account the possible untoward consequences that might befall each state,
posing a dilemma for each:
• For R:  by not mobilizing, it remains dissatisfied; by mobilizing, it may provoke 
            S to countermobilize.
• For S (if R mobilizes):  by not countermobilizing, it remains vulnerable; by
  countermobilizing, it may ignite rather than prevent a war that could prove
  disastrous to both countries.4
While the security dilemma is usually identified with conflicts, like arms races, that may
spiral out of control (Jervis, 1976, 1978), standard models of this dilemma, including
Prisoners’ Dilemma, say nothing about the dynamics of spiraling.5  By contrast, the rules
of play of TOM that I will present in section 2 capture the dynamics of mobilization and
countermobilization decisions in catch-22 games—none of which is a Prisoners’
Dilemma—especially if one or both states believes it possesses “moving power” (defined
and illustrated in section 3).
                                          
4While R’s initial provocation is usually aimed at one country, it may have a cascading
effect, involving others as well.  Consider the note that an astonished Kaiser Wilhelm II
wrote on the margin of a message from Czar Nicholas II on July 30, 1914:  “And these
measures [military preparations by Russia, instituted in secret almost a week before
Germany’s] are for a defense against Austria, which is in no way attacking him!!!”
Incredulous that the Russian Czar would see the much smaller Austria as a threat to
Russia, the German Kaiser concluded that Russia’s mobilization was really aimed against
Germany.  He responded accordingly:  “Begin [preparations]!  Now!” (quoted in Holsti,
1965, p. 368).
5Zagare and Kilgour (1998) propose a more elaborate game-theoretic model that
reconciles conflict spirals and deterrence theory, but “dynamics” in the sense of possible
cycling is not modeled.  A different kind of dynamics is modeled by repeated play of
games and evolutionary game theory, but the assumption that the same game, except for
possible mutations, is played de novo again and again seems unrealistic in most
international relations applications.4
In section 4, I define a generic “Mobilization Game” under modified TOM rules,
dividing the 12 specific catch-22 games subsumed by the generic game into three
mutually classes.  These classes provide conditions under which countries would be
expected to mobilize their forces to fight a war.  They depend on whether a country
expects its mobilization to (i) be reciprocated by its opponent, (ii) not reciprocated, or (iii)
be uncertain about reciprocation.  These expectations will be conditioned not only by the
preferences of the two players but also by which, if either, possesses moving power.
In section 5 I apply the Mobilization Game to two cases of crisis escalation in the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict, one that occurred in 1960 and the other in 1967.6  In both,
Egypt was the revisionist player and began by mobilizing its forces.  Israel reciprocated,
but in varying degrees in each crisis.  Whereas the Rotem crisis in 1960 quickly subsided
after both sides pulled back their forces from a confrontation, there was no such
resolution in 1967, which culminated in the Six-Day war that also involved Jordan and
Syria as allies of Egypt.  I analyze three stages of the latter crisis, based on Mor (1993), to
suggest why Israel was not provoked to attack until the third phase of this crisis.
In section 6, I examine the milder dissatisfaction of players in four “king-of-the-
mountain games” (Brams and Jones, 1997), indicating why these games are less
dangerous than a catch-22 games.  Indeed, the Rotem crisis may be better approximated
by one of these games than by one of the catch-22 games.  On the other hand, the
evidence seems overwhelming that the antagonists in the 1967 crisis were caught up, at
least toward the end, in catch-22 games.
                                          
6The classic example of crisis escalation is the July 1914 crisis, which has the earmarks of
a series of catch-22s that proceeded from Austria and Serbia to the great powers,
enveloping in succession Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain.  It is too
complicated a case to analyze within the compass of this paper, but I agree with
Trachtenberg (1990/91) and Levy (1990/91) that the war that resulted from the
mobilization decisions that each country made was not inadvertent; see also Levy,
Christensen, and Trachtenberg (1991).  A game-theoretic model showing how these
decisions were interconnected, and why war emerged as an equilibrium or a power-
induced outcome, has yet to be developed.5
The 16 catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games exhaust the 2 x 2 cyclic games in
which moving power is “effective.”  In these games, which constitute 28% of all conflict
games and 44% of the cyclic games, each player will be motivated to move—especially if
it thinks it has moving power—in order to try to wear down its opponent and come out on
top.  Surprisingly, perhaps, at least one and sometimes both of the outcomes induced by
moving power are not associated with Nash equilibria, demonstrating that this static
equilibrium may be dynamically unstable and fail to predict the shifting positions that
players take in catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games.
2.  Theory of Moves (TOM)7
The starting point of TOM is a payoff matrix, or configuration, in which the order
of play is not specified.  In fact, players are assumed not even to choose strategies but,
instead, to move and countermove from outcomes in a game of complete information
(they know their opponent’s payoffs as well as their own).
Under one set of rules of TOM, players look ahead and use backward induction to
determine the rationality of not only their moves but also those of an opponent.  The
backward-induction calculations assume that players do not cycle in a payoff matrix.
In the case of catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games, however, I assume that
cycling is possible and, accordingly, postulate rules of play that allow for cycling as well
as the exercise of moving power.  Implications of these alternative rules are developed in
Brams (1994, ch. 4), which I will summarize and illustrate in this section and section 3.
First, however, I discuss the rules of play that are common to games that cycle and games
that do not.
Because game theory assumes that players choose strategies simultaneously,8 it
does not raise questions about the rationality of moving or departing from outcomes—at
                                          
7This and section 3 are adapted from Brams and Jones (1997) and Brams (1994).6
least beyond an immediate departure, à la Nash.  In fact, however, most real-life games
do not start with simultaneous strategy choices but commence at outcomes.  The question
then becomes whether a player, by departing from an outcome, can do better not just in
an immediate or myopic sense but, rather, in an extended or nonmyopic sense.
In the case of 2 x 2 games, in which each of two players chooses between two
strategies, TOM postulates four rules of play, which describe the possible choices of the
players at different stages:
 l.  Play starts at an outcome, called the initial state, which is at the intersection of
     the row and column of a 2 x 2 payoff matrix.
2.  Either player can unilaterally switch its strategy, and thereby change the initial
     state into a new state, in the same row or column as the initial state.9  The
     player that switches, which may be either R or C, is called player l (Pl).
3.  Player 2 (P2) can respond by unilaterally switching its strategy, thereby moving
     the game to a new state.
4.  The alternating responses continue until the player (Pl or P2) whose turn it is to
     move next chooses not to switch its strategy.  When this happens, the game
     terminates in a final state, which is the outcome of the game.
                                                                                                                             
8Strategies may allow for sequential choices, but classical game theory does not make
endogenous who moves first, as TOM does, but instead specifies a fixed order of play
(simultaneous or sequential).  In the case of the alternative rules allowing for cycling that
I apply here, however, which player moves first, and the initial state from which it moves,
have no bearing on the outcome.  But which player possesses moving power, and can
thereby force termination of play, is critical, as I will show in section 3.
9I do not use “strategy” in the usual sense to mean a complete plan of responses by the
players to all possible contingencies allowed by rules 2-4, because this would make the
normal form unduly complicated to analyze.  Rather, strategies refer to the choices made
by players that define a state, and moves and countermoves to their subsequent strategy
switches from an initial state to a final state in an extensive-form game, as allowed by
rules 2-4.  For another approach to combining the normal and extensive forms, see
Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels (1993, 1994).7
Note that the sequence of moves and countermoves is strictly alternating:  first, say, R
moves, then C moves, and so on, until one player stops, at which point the state reached
is final and, therefore, the outcome of the game.10
The use of the word “state” is meant to convey the temporary nature of an
outcome, before players decide to stop switching strategies.  I assume that no payoffs
accrue to players from being in a state unless it is the final state and, therefore, becomes
the outcome (which could be the initial state if the players choose not to move from it).11
Rule l differs radically from the corresponding rule of play in classical game
theory, in which players simultaneously choose strategies in a matrix game, which
determines an outcome.  Instead of starting with strategy choices, I assume that players
are already in some state at the start of play and receive payoffs from this state if they
stay.  Based on these payoffs, they decide, individually, whether or not to change this
state in order to try to do better, which may involve either mental moves or physical
moves.
To be sure, some decisions are made collectively by players, in which case it
would be reasonable to say that they choose strategies from scratch, either independently
or by coordinating their choices.  But if, say, two countries are coordinating their choices,
as when they agree to sign a treaty, the most important strategic question is what
individualistic calculations led them to this point.  The formality of jointly signing the
treaty is the culmination of their negotiations, which reveals nothing of the move-
                                          
10An emendation in the rules of TOM that allows for backtracking would be appropriate
in games of incomplete information, wherein players may make mistakes that they wish
to rectify.  For more on possible rules changes under TOM, see Brams (1994); on rules
that allow for backtracking, see Willson (1998).  I will return to the issue of backtracking
in section 4.
11However, players do suffer costs from moving, which is how moving power comes into
play:  it distinguishes which, if either, player can better endure these costs and,
consequently, hold out longer.  In section 4, I will incorporate such costs into play of the
Mobilization Game.8
countermove process that preceded it.  This is precisely what TOM is designed to
uncover.
In summary, play of a game starts in a state, at which players accrue payoffs only if
they remain in that state so that it becomes the outcome of the game.  If they do not
remain, they still know what payoffs they would have accrued had they stayed; hence,
they can make a rational calculation of the advantages of staying versus moving.  They
move precisely because they calculate that they can do better by switching states,
anticipating a better outcome if and when the move-countermove process finally comes to
rest.
Rules l–4 say nothing about what causes a game to end but only when:  termination
occurs when a “player whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy”
(rule 4).  But when is it rational not to continue moving, or not to move in the first place
from an initial state?
The rules of TOM that preclude cycling, and the return of play to the initial state,
include two so-called rationality rules:  a termination rule (rule 5) and a two-sidedness
rule (rule 6), which lead to the definition of “nonmyopic equilibria,” based on backward
induction.  I will not discuss this equilibrium concept here—it does not capture the
cyclicity of catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games.  Instead, I define a different
solution concept, based on alternative rules 5' and 6'; rule 5' permits players to cycle in a
matrix, and rule 6' enables one player, if it possesses moving power, to terminate the
cycling.
To model the cyclic aspect of certain conflicts and also give players the ability to
make choices in which they repeat themselves (why they may do so will be considered
shortly), I next define a class of games in which cycling is possible by precluding a class
of games in which it is not.  Rule 5' provides a sufficient condition for cycling not to
occur:9
5'.  If, at any state in the move-countermove process, a player whose turn it is to
      move next receives its best payoff, it will not move from this state.
In the subsequent analysis, I will focus exclusively on 2 x 2 strict ordinal games, in
which each player ranks the four possible outcomes as follows:  4 = best; 3 = next best;
2 = next worst; 1 = worst.  Rule 5', which says that a player will never move from a state
in which it receives a payoff of 4, precludes cycling in 42 of the 78 distinct 2 x 2 strict
ordinal games, 21 of which contain a mutually best (4,4) state.  Excluding the latter
games, there are 57 conflict games, 36 of which are cyclic, as defined by property 1 in
section 1.
Because only 12 of the cyclic games are catch-22 games, properties 2 and 3 have
bite—they confer catch-22 status on only one-third of cyclic games.  In these games, the
incentive that players have to cycle to try to attain their best outcomes creates frustration
when the player with moving power uses it to force the other player to choose between its
two worst outcomes.
As an illustration of one game that does not cycle and one that does, consider the
two games shown in Figure 1 (these are games 22 and 35 in the Appendix of Brams,
________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1 about here
________________________________________________________________________
1994).  Starting from (4,2) in each of these games, neither player has an incentive to
move, according to both standard game theory (it is a Nash equilibrium) and TOM (it is a
nonmyopic equilibrium).12
But, in fact, there is a significant difference between these two games: game 35 is
“cyclic,” whereas game 22 is not.  To illustrate this distinction, first consider game 22.
                                          
12Nash equilibria are usually defined in terms of the strategies that yield particular
outcomes, not the outcomes themselves.  Because only pure-strategy equilibria are
defined in ordinal games, however, Nash-equilibrium strategies can be referenced by the
outcomes they produce.10
Cycling will not occur—in either a clockwise or counterclockwise direction—in this
game because moves from any state eventually bring the process to a state where the
player who moves next receives its best payoff of 4, making a move from this state
irrational, according to rule 5'.  Thus, for example,
• in a clockwise direction, the move by R from (2,l) to (l,4) gives C its best payoff,
  so C will not move from (l,4), as shown by the blocked arrow emanating from
  (l,4); and
• in a counterclockwise direction, the move by C from (2,l) to (4,2) gives R its best
  payoff, so R will not move from (4,2), as shown by the blocked arrow emanating
  from (4,2).
Now consider game 35 in Figure l.  Although a counterclockwise move by C from
(2,l) to (4,2) gives R its best payoff, preventing cycling in a counterclockwise direction—
as shown by the blocked arrow emanating from (4,2)—moves in a clockwise direction
never give a player its best payoff when it has the next move:  R at (2,l), C at (l,3), R at
(3,4), and C at (4,2) never receive payoffs of 4, making cycling in a clockwise direction
possible, according to rule 5', as shown by the clockwise arrows in Figure 1.
The fact that clockwise moves around the payoff matrix of game 35 do not violate
rule 5' renders this game cyclic.  In cyclic games, it turns out, cycling can occur in only
one direction—either clockwise or counterclockwise, but not both (Brams, 1994,
Theorem 4.1, pp. 90-91).
Game 22, in which cycling in both directions runs amok of a player receiving its
best payoff (4) when it is its turn to move, makes it noncyclic.  The 42 2 x 2 noncyclic
games include all 12 symmetric games (e.g., Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken), wherein
the  payoffs of the players can be arranged so that their ranks along the main diagonal are11
the same and those on the off-diagonal are mirror images of each other (Brams, 1994,
Corollary 4.1, p. 91).13
To summarize, no symmetric game is cyclic; if an asymmetric game is cyclic,
cycling can go in only one direction.  As I will illustrate in section 6, cyclic games can be
divided into three classes—strongly cyclic, moderately cyclic, and weakly cyclic—but
first I analyze moving power in these games.
3.  Moving Power
In cyclic games, under what circumstances would players have an incentive to
cycle to try to outlast an opponent?  By “outlasting” I mean that one (stronger) player can
force the other (weaker) player to stop the move-countermove process at a state where the
weaker player has the next move.
Forcing stoppage at such a state involves the exercise of moving power.  One
player (P1) has moving power if it can force the other player (P2) to stop, in the process
of cycling, at one of the two states at which P2 has the next move.  The state at which P2
stops, I assume, is that which P2 prefers.
Recall that rule 5' specified what players would not do—namely, move from a best
(4) state when it was their turn to move.  However, this rule did not say anything about
where cycling would stop, which the exercise of moving power determines by enabling
the player who possesses it (I assume there is at most one player who does) to break the
cycle of moves.
Rule 6' ensures that there will be termination:
                                          
13Because Prisoners’ Dilemma, in particular, is not cyclic—much less a catch-22 game—
the frustration it gives rise to is very different from that induced by a catch-22 game.  In
my view, it does not create a security dilemma in the sense described in section 1,
because no movement from its noncooperative (2,2) Nash equilibrium, either by R or by
S, is justified.  By contrast, in the Mobilization Game, movement by the dissatisfied
player may well be justified—at least in the class I catch-22 games described in section
4—to try to improve on the status quo.12
6'.  At some point in the cycling, P2 must stop.
This is not to say that P1 will always exercise its moving power.  In some games, as I will
show, it is rational for P1 to terminate play, even though it can always force P2 to stop
first.
Moving power is effective if the outcome that a player can induce with this power
is better for it than the outcome that the other player can induce.  To illustrate when
moving power is effective, consider game 56 in Figure 2a.  The arrows shown in Figure
________________________________________________________________________
Figures 2a and 2b about here
________________________________________________________________________
2a (ignore for now the distinction between the single and the double arrows) illustrate the
cyclicity of game 56 in a counterclockwise direction:  starting in the upper right-hand
state,
• C benefits by moving from (4,2) to (2,4);
• R does not benefit by moving from (2,4) to (1,1)—which is what I later call an
   “impediment”—but it departs from a 2, not a 4, state so does not violate rule 5';
• C benefits by moving from (1,1) to (3,3); and
• R benefits by moving from (3,3) to (4,2).
Because neither player, when it is its turn to move, ever departs from its best state of 4 (C
departs from 2 or 1, R from 2 or 3), game 56 is cyclic.
To show what outcome R can induce if it has moving power, which might be
thought of as greater stamina or endurance—in the sense that R can continue moving
when C must eventually stop—let R’s moves (vertical, as illustrated on the left side of
Figure 2a) be represented by double arrows.  C, whose (horizontal) moves are represented
by single arrows, must stop in the cycling at either (1,1) or (4,2), whence its single arrows13
emanate that indicate it has the next move.  Since C would prefer to stop at (4,2) rather
than (1,1), R can induce its best state of (4,2) if it has moving power.
On the other hand, if C has moving power (right side of Figure 2a), it can force R
to stop at either (2,4) or (3,3), whence its single arrows emanate that indicate it has the
next move.  Since R would prefer to stop at (3,3) rather than (2,4), C can induce its next-
best outcome of (3,3) if it has moving power.  Thus, the possession of moving power
benefits the player who possesses it—compared with the other player’s possession of it—
so it is effective in game 56.
This is not the case in a game in which 1 and 2 are interchanged for C in game 56,
which defines game 49 in Figure 2b.  Applying the foregoing reasoning to game 49, we
see that R can induce only (1,2), because C prefers this state to (4,1), the other state from
which it can move.
On the other hand, C can induce (3,3), because R prefers this state to (2,4), the
other state from which it can move.  Hence, moving power is not effective in game 49:  R
cannot induce a better outcome when it has moving power than when C has it.  Instead,
moving power in game 49 is “irrelevant,” because it would be in R’s interest to stop at
(3,3), even if it has moving power, rather than to force C to stop at (1,2).  More generally,
moving power is irrelevant when the outcome induced by one player is better for both.14
In many real-world conflicts, there may be no clear recognition of which, if either,
player has moving power.  In fact, there may be a good deal of uncertainty or
misinformation.  For example, if both players believe they can hold out longer in a game
in which moving power is effective, cycling is likely to persist until one player succeeds
                                          
14There is a third possibility:  moving power is ineffective for a player when the outcome
its opponent can induce is better than the outcome the player in question can induce with
this power.  Moving power is ineffective in only 4 of the 36 cyclic games, whereas it is
irrelevant in 16 games and effective in 16 games.  As I will show later, 12 of the 16
games in which moving power is effective are catch-22 games; the remaining 4 games are
king-of-the-mountain games.14
in demonstrating its greater stamina, or both players are exhausted by the repeated
cycling.
4.  The Mobilization Game
The 12 catch-22 games that meet the four conditions given in section 1 are shown
in Figure 3.15  In fact, the cyclicity condition (condition 1) is redundant—it is implied by
________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3 about here
________________________________________________________________________
the three other conditions.  Put another way, if moving power is effective, which these
conditions ensure, a game is always cyclic (Brams and Jones, 1997, Theorem 1).
The generic Mobilization Game shown in Figure 3, in which cycling occurs in a
clockwise direction, gives a first cut at the mobilization decisions two countries might
face.  In modeling mobilization decisions, it is useful to divide the 12 catch-22 games
subsumed by the generic Mobilization Game into three mutually exclusive classes (see
Figure 3), for each of which we indicate levels of satisfaction/dissatisfaction and likely
moves by the players:
  I.   R and C satisfied (rank 3 or 4) after C’s mobilization—either no movement  
       (stay at c state) or backtracking (return to r state) (4 games)16;
 II.  R dissatisfied (rank 2) after C’s mobilization—likely movement to c or r states
      (2 games);
III.  R very dissatisfied (rank 1) after C’s mobilization—very likely movement to
                                          
15See Brams and Jones (1997) for a precise definition of the generic catch-22 game and a
demonstration that these 12 games meet the aforementioned conditions.  The breakdown
of these games into three classes will be explained shortly.
16The possibility of backtracking, not permitted so far, will be discussed shortly.  The
superscripted c and r states indicate the outcomes that C and R, respectively, can induce
with moving power.  Note that in only 4 of the 12 catch-22 games (42, 43, 44, 45) is C,
too, able to put R in a catch-22, whereby R receives its next-worst (2) rather than its next-
best (3) payoff at the c state.15
       c or r states (6 games).
Because the TOM rules given in sections 2 and 3 seem too rigid to model the
mobilization decisions that countries make, I next introduce both more options and more
ambiguity into the countries’ strategic situation.  To wit, instead of assuming that R has
moving power (condition 4), assume
A1.  Either player might possess moving power, or neither might.
In addition, to give impetus to the countries’ need to make decisions in a problematic
situation, I assume play begins when C is caught in a catch-22:
A2.   Play starts in the upper left cell in Figure 3 (status quo, or SQ), which is the
         moving-power outcome that R can induce (r state);
A3.   C is dissatisfied at SQ (by receiving 2), and R is satisfied (by receiving 3 or
         4).
A glance at Figure 3 confirms that all 12 catch-22 games contain a (4,2) or (3,2) r state,
rendering R satisfied and C dissatisfied at the status quo.
Whatever the initial state of the game, rule 6' in section 3 says that at some point in
the cycling the player without moving power (P2) must stop.  But if there is no consensus
as to which player, if either, possesses moving power by assumption A1, then one cannot
specify which moving-power outcome will be implemented (the c state or the r state).
I introduce further indeterminateness into the Mobilization Game model by making
two additional assumptions:
A4.  There is an (unspecified) cost to the players in “passing through” inferior
        states.
A5.  A player can, after moving, either (i) backtrack or (ii) make a second
        consecutive move to a new state if the other player does not move next. 16
In the Mobilization Game, assumption A5 allows C, after mobilizing, to retract its
decision and return to the r state if R does not countermobilize first.  But if R
countermobilizes and thereby precipitates a war, assumption A5 allows R to be the first to
retreat (which may be interpreted as retracting its prior countermobilization) if C does not
do so first.
Despite the ambiguity introduced by not specifying which player, if either, has
moving power, I assume
A6.  One of the two moving-power states (either the c state or the r state) will be
        the outcome of the game.
Assumption A6 says, in effect, that the expectations of the player will converge on the
game’s “coming to rest” at one of the two moving-power states.
These assumptions permit more free-flowing moves than were permitted by the
earlier TOM rules.  In the case of the Mobilization Game, the players’ possible moves are
depicted in the following flow diagram:
                                                        Possible Backtracking
Class I                         Status Quo (SQ)    -------------------------   C mobilizes—crisis
                           Retreat by C to old SQ
                           (r state)
Classes II & III                                                                              R countermobilizes—war
                           Retreat by R to new SQ
                           (c state)
Once C mobilizes and R countermobilizes, it should be noted, retreat decisions are
not exactly “free” choices:  they depend on which country wins or loses the war,17
assuming there is no stalemate.17  Consequently, the countries must try to anticipate the
results of a war—should the crisis escalate to this level—which will presumably depend
on which country has moving power.   If this is uncertain, the countries may go to war to
find out.  C, especially, will be motivated to do so to the extent that it considers the status
quo intolerable.
Several conclusions follow from the foregoing assumptions, including why class I
games, as suggested in the flow diagram, are not likely to escalate beyond the crisis stage,
whereas class II and class III games are likely to lead to war and, subsequently, to either
the old or a new status quo.
Class I:  Crisis likely.  In these four games, both the c and r states fall in the first
row, suggesting that because of the costs of war for both players—giving either a (1,1) or
a (2,1) state—R will have a strong incentive not to countermobilize.  Thus, if C mobilizes
and creates a crisis, the game is likely to stay in this state if C has moving power, or
backtrack to the status quo if R has moving power.18  Not only does neither player want
to suffer the costs of war at states (1,1) or (2,1), but both players are satisfied (by
receiving either a 3 or 4) in the crisis state, which is not true of any other state in these
four games.  If the c state is indeed the one that is implemented, its choice can be
interpreted as leading to an “adjustment” favorable to C.  On the other hand, if R
prevails—possibly by inducing cycling through war but, more likely, by forcing C to
                                          
17The country that loses will presumably retreat first, which will not necessarily be C
even though it has the next move, following war, in the 2 x 2 generic Mobilization Game.
In effect, strategies in the Mobilization Game are suppressed in the flow diagram in order
to allow for the possibility that R will retreat first.
18True, the players may need to cycle to discover which player, if either, has moving
power, as happened in the 1967 war.  But the Rotem crisis demonstrates that war can be
avoided if there is a common perception that C, once it escalates, anticipates it would
suffer if it does not back down.18
backtrack if C believes that R possesses moving power—there would be no adjustment
and play would return to the status quo (r state).
Class II:  War likely.  In these two games, the war state is the mutually worst
(1,1) state, but the crisis state for R is only one rank better (2).19  If R elects to
countermobilize and precipitates war, it can force a return to the status quo and obtain its
best outcome (4) at the r state if it has moving power.  If, by contrast, C has moving
power and consequently prevails in the war, it can force R to retreat to the c state.  In the
latter case, R still receives a satisfactory 3; in fact, this c state is the only one that is
satisfactory for both players in these two games.  Thus, whichever player thinks it has
moving power, the game is likely to pass through war before going to the r or c state.
Class III:  War very likely.  In these six games, moves in a clockwise direction
from every state lead to an immediately better state for the mover, so there is an incentive
for C to mobilize and R to countermobilize, especially if they are myopic (unlike in the
class I and class II games, in which the strategies associated with the c state constitute a
Nash equilibrium).20  Whichever player prevails in the resulting war can induce its
preferred state (c state if R retreats first, r state if C does), obviating the need for complete
cycling.21
It is instructive to contrast these results with the answer that the earlier TOM rules
would give to the following question: 
                                          
19To be sure, these rankings say nothing about the difference in magnitude, as measured
by cardinal utilities, between a 1 and a 2 state.  Because R is “dissatisfied” in either state,
however, I assume it would be more ready to move to a 1 state from a 2 state (class II
games) than from a 3 state (class I games).
20As I will show in section 6, there are no “impediments” in these six games, making
moves “frictionless.”
21The fact that R ranks war 3 or 4 in four of the six class III games might be interpreted to
mean that R expects to win in these games; in fact, in the case of rank 4, R prefers war to
a return to the status quo (r state).19
When will C move from the status quo, when will R reciprocate this
move, and when will possible cycling ensue?
The answer to this question is unambiguous, in fact, only if one player possesses moving
power and both players believe it:
• C will never move from the status quo if both players believe R possesses moving
  power, because R can induce moves that return play to it (the r state);
• C will always move from the status quo if both players believe C possesses
  moving power, because C can induce moves that carry play to the new status
  quo (the c state).
These stark answers, however, cover up what might happen in the more ambiguous
and probably more common situation in which the player that possesses moving power, if
either, is not apparent.  Furthermore, the earlier TOM rules do not take into account the
fact that one or both players might prefer not to cycle—because of the costs of war—or
that the war will not always entail C’s retreating first (by retracting its prior mobilization)
if it should possess moving power.
To sum up, I have suggested that a dissatisfied country often faces a catch-22 in
deciding whether or not to mobilize its forces against an opponent.  If the dissatisfied
country possesses moving power, it can always induce a better outcome for itself, but
sometimes at the cost of going to war (in class II and III games).  Assumptions about this
cost and about the ambiguity of which, if either, country possesses moving power—and
can force retreat by the other if war breaks out—were introduced to try to mirror the
realities of mobilization decisions in catch-22 games.
Countries are likely to refrain from war in four or the 12 catch-22 games (class I),
whereas in 2 of these games they are likely to be pushed over the edge, even though war20
is the worst outcome for both (class II).  In the remaining 6 games (class III), war is all
but certain to be precipitated by the dissatisfied country’s mobilization.
The rationality of these decisions depends on where the countries anticipate the
moves will eventually carry them (either to a c or an r outcome, based on the earlier TOM
rules).  To be sure, they will not necessarily realize this outcome as an immediate payoff
from making a move.  Thus in class II games, R is likely to countermobilize and thereby
instigate a war, even though R would be immediately better off staying at the Nash
equilibrium resulting from C’s initial mobilization.
I next examine some empirical evidence on mobilization decisions in the 1960 and
1967 Egyptian-Israeli crises.  I break the latter crisis down into three different phases,
which correspond to being in, successively, each of the three classes of the Mobilization
Game.
5.  Mobilization Games Actually Played
The 1960 Crisis
The so-called Rotem crisis occurred in January 1960, when Egyptian president
Gamal Abdoul Nasser moved 50,000 troops and 500 tanks into the Sinai peninsula in
reaction to an Israeli strike against the Syrian village of Tawfik.  When Israel responded
with the secret mobilization of an armed brigade that it deployed near the Egyptian border
but “refrained from acts or utterances that could escalate the crisis” (Yaniv, 1987, p. 85),
Nasser withdrew his troops from the Sinai 32 hours later.
The “discreet” nature of Israel’s countermobilization (Mor, 1993, p. 120) suggests
that neither Egypt’s nor Israel’s intent was mobilization for war, which is the
interpretation I give to mobilization and countermobilization in the flow diagram in
section 4.  In this diagram, Nasser, after moving to mobilize to create a crisis, was
evidently deterred from escalating further—in fact, induced to deescalate—by his21
perception of prime minister David Ben Gurion’s no-compromise attitude and Israel’s
perceived military prowess (demonstrated four years earlier in the 1956 Suez war).
These actions square with the preferences of Israel (row player) and Egypt (column
player) in class I games.  In these games, both sides do badly (rank 1 or 2) if there is a
war.  In particular, Egypt would prefer to return to the status quo, especially if—as was
the case—it anticipates it will lose a war it might spark.  Thus, Egypt was led to
backtrack, which is a rational move in class I games, even though Nasser, it seems,
remained quite dissatisfied by the status quo.
The 1967 Crisis
This crisis has been studied in detail by Mor (1993), who develops a model, based
on TOM, to analyze nonmyopic equilibria in a set of “crisis games.”  His model allows
for both misperception and deception.  It also permits learning, whereby the players
observe the consequences of their early actions and then use this information to update
their knowledge when they make choices later in the crisis.
Mor’s (1993) model accurately predicts the choices of Egypt and Israel, based on
the specific games that he reconstructs they played.  Unlike Mor (1993), I will not
reconstruct specific games but instead will attempt to show that, whatever the specific
game played, it was probably a catch-22 game.  Moreover, perceptions of this game
changed over the course of the crisis, moving it from class I to class II to class III.22
The choices of players in Mor’s (1993) 25 crisis games are the generic strategies of
cooperation or defection, compared with the choices of mobilization and, if there is
countermobilization and a war, retreat in the 12 catch-22 games.  While the crisis games
have no overlap with the 12 catch-22 games, I will argue that the generic Mobilization
Game, and the classes of specific games subsumed by it, help to explain why decision-
                                          
22Later I will discuss why both sides’ perceptions of the game changed, but suffice to say
here that learning by the leaders on both sides seemed overwhelmingly driven by
evidence, not wishful thinking.22
makers made different choices in the early and later stages of this crisis.  Their
perceptions at each stage of the crisis, and the outcomes of games that they played, are
recounted below:
Stage 1:  Egyptians mobilize.  On May 14, 1967, Nasser placed the Egyptian
army on alert and sent 50,000 troops into the Sinai.  Until this move, neither side
expected or desired war (Khouri, 1968, pp. 224-225; Yost, 1968, p. 304; Dawn, 1968, p.
202).
Mor (1993) disputes the claims of several analysts that Nasser was irrational.  He
argues, among other things, that Nasser was not impulsive or rash, not paranoiac, did not
lack foresight, and did not lose control (some details on Nasser’s reasoning will be given
shortly).  Indeed, as Mor (1993) points out, Nasser was fully aware of his weak military
position vis-à-vis Israel, which was aggravated by his having already committed 50,000
United Arab Republic troops to bolster Egypt’s interests and position in Yemen.
Nasser, on numerous occasions, had expressed his dismay at Arabs who, he
claimed, irresponsibly called for a war with Israel without preparing properly for it.
Moreover, he backed his words with deeds by not coming to the aid of either Jordan or
Syria when Israel launched attacks against each in the year preceding the 1967 crisis.  In
sum, “Nasser, however dissatisfied he was with the status quo, still preferred it to war
with Israel” (Mor, 1993, p. 119; see also Yaniv, 1987, p. 118; Nutting, 1972, p. 367;
Safran, 1969, p. 273).
By all accounts, Nasser was the sole decision-maker on the Egyptian side.  On the
Israeli side, there were several key decision makers; each held somewhat different views
of the Egyptian leader, and his motivations, ranging from relatively benign to relatively
ominous.23
                                          
23For details, see Brecher (1972, 1975); Prittie (1969); and Stein and Tanter (1980).23
There was, nonetheless, a consensus among Israeli leaders that Nasser’s objectives
were limited in the first stage of the crisis.  Both sides realized that Israel’s defense forces
could defeat not only Egypt but, almost surely, the combined forces of its Arab neighbors
as well.  However, there was fear on the part of Israelis that they might suffer major
casualties if attacked first, unlikely as that seemed in the first part of the crisis.24
As in the Rotem crisis, Israel saw Egypt as seeking an adjustment in the status
quo—or at least a demonstration of its solidarity with its Arab neighbors, which had
taunted it for its previous inaction against Israeli incursions into their territory.  Thus,
Egypt did not position its 50,000 troops in the Sinai in a forward deployment but, rather,
in the center of the Sinai, as if signaling that it did not desire war (Slater, 1977, p. 121).
Israel responded mildly to the Egyptian deployment, as it had in the Rotem crisis:
it alerted regular army units, deployed some forces to its southern border, and mobilized a
few additional units.  Also, it informed Egypt through UN channels that it did not intend
to invade Syria.  These moves are consistent with Israel’s playing a class I game, in
which both sides receive payoffs of 3 or 4 after C’s mobilization, and there is no
countermobilization for war by R.  It is also consistent with Egypt’s improving on the
status quo by deterring Israel from further escalation and, consequently, not provoking
war.
Stage 2:  Withdrawal of UNEF.  On May 16, just two days after Egypt had sent
forces into the Sinai, it requested a redeployment to backward positions of United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) troops, which, after the 1956 war, had assumed
positions as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.  Notably, Nasser did not request the
redeployment of UNEF troops at Tiran (or Sharm el Sheikh), because he did not want his
move to be seen as presaging the closure of the Straits of Tiran, which Israel might
interpret as a casus belli (Mor, 1993, p. 132).
                                          
24Nasser later estimated the likelihood of war at 20% in the first stage (Laqueur, 1968, pp.
197-207).24
When UN Secretary-General U Thant threw down the gauntlet and responded that
either all UNEF forces would have to be withdrawn or none, Nasser was forced to make a
choice.  On May 18, after it became clear that he would request that the entire UNEF
force be withdrawn, Israel followed on May 19 with a large-scale mobilization of its
reserves and planning for a preemptive strike into the Sinai (Brecher, 1980, pp. 109-111).
Why did Nasser escalate the crisis on May 18?  It appears that he interpreted
Israel’s response in stage I as sufficiently timid that Egypt could afford to go one step
further without seriously risking war.  Another  explanation for Egypt’s boldness is that
Israel’s prime minister, Levi Eshkol, was known as “a man of compromise.”  Eshkol
certainly did not have the formidable reputation of Israel’s founding prime minister,
David Ben-Gurion, whose resolve at the time of the Rotem crisis nobody doubted (Prittie,
1969).
Despite Israel’s mobilization on May 19,25 Israel did its best to conduct business as
usual, playing down the threat to its territory and calling, at the UN and in other arenas,
for a withdrawal of forces and a return to the status quo.  But more hawkish elements in
Israel saw its position as eroding and called for stronger measures against Egypt.
At a minimum, it seems fair to say, UNEF’s withdrawal lowered Israel’s
preference ranking from 3 in class I games to 2 in class II games.  With the elimination of
the buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces, war seemed more likely.  Still, there was
deep concern on the part of some Israeli leaders about moving closer to the brink, so war
was not yet foreordained.
While sure that Israel could prevail in a war, especially if it preempted, Israeli
leaders conceded that the costs of war could be great.  A return to the status quo, as had
occurred in the Rotem crisis, remained the preferred solution of most of its leaders.
                                          
25It fell short of full-scale preparation for war, so I do not consider its counter-
mobilization tantamount to war.25
Because the Egyptian army continued to be deployed in a defensive formation, an
attack was not seen as imminent.  Consequently, Israel decided to give international
diplomacy more time, even though class II games certainly make war more likely.
Stage 3.  Blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the Egyptian-Jordanian Defense
Agreement.  On May 22, Nasser announced that he would blockade the Straits of Tiran,
restoring the pre-1956 conditions that closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.  Up
until this escalation, Meir Amit, then head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service,
recalled that
until May 23, I thought there was a possibility for maneuver, that there
is a leeway for alternatives.  But when Nasser closed the Straits, I said:
“This is it, there is no way to avoid war” (Brecher, 1980, p. 104).
Nasser was under great pressure, especially after his UNEF decision, to demand
still more of the Israelis and show that he was not just bluffing.  These demands reached a
fever pitch when inflammatory broadcasts of Radio Cairo and other Arab stations
triggered mass hysteria throughout the Arab world.
Nasser, however, was not swept away by the war fever.  Later he reported that after
the closure of the Straits of Tiran, his earlier estimate of a 20% probability of war had
increased to 50% (Laqueur, 1968, pp. 197-207).
Despite the growing odds that war was unavoidable, it was difficult for Nasser to
back down.  After all, he had achieved so much—in the apt phrase of Israel’s foreign
minister, Abba Eban, a “victory without war” (Evan, 1977, p. 360).  Moreover, should a
war break out, Nasser reasoned, the UN would intervene to stop the fighting, so his losses
would be cut.
Nasser’s calculations are in line with the possible outcomes of class III games.
1.  In all these games, C (Egypt’s) escalation leads to the worst state (1) for R26
     (Israel), so Israel has no choice but to countermobilize for war.
2.  While the war outcome is immediately better for Israel, varying in rank from 2
      to 4, and worst for Egypt (1), it is only temporary (as it turned out, the war
      lasted only six days).
3.  If Egypt, perhaps with the help of the UN, can induce the c state (even while
     losing the war), then it improves on the status quo.
4.  At worst, the status quo is restored if Israel triumphs (r state), but Nasser would
     have shown courage in the face of adversity. Thereby he could polish his
     somewhat tarnished pre-war image, becoming a leader steadfast in his pursuit
     of the Arab cause.
As for the Israelis, after they received a stern warning on May 28 from President
Lyndon Johnson not to strike preemptively, the Israeli cabinet supported a two- to three-
week delay in order to give the United States a chance to work out a possible compromise
that would open up the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Brecher, 1980, p. 144).  But
two days later, Nasser dropped another bombshell—the signing of the Egyptian-
Jordanian Defense Agreement in Cairo.  The euphoric reaction of both leaders and
masses in the Arab world created a frenzy to complete the destruction of Israel.
Astonishingly, Nasser at this point stopped his belligerent pronouncements and
attempted to persuade Israel that a diplomatic solution could be found.  With his seeming
political objectives achieved, he gave orders that Egyptian forces assume strictly
defensive positions in the Sinai and that there be no military provocations.  He initiated a
series of diplomatic moves in search of a political compromise (Nutting, 1972, p. 408;
Bar-Zohar, 1970, p. 176; Khouri, 1968, p. 147).
But time had run out.  Because of general mobilization, the Israeli economy was at
a standstill (Maoz, 1990, p. 129).  With the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Israeli
defense minister on June 1, the outcome of the crisis was sealed.  Stunned by the defense27
pact and fearful that joint Arab military actions could be devastating (Stein and Tanter,
1980, p. 218), Israel initiated its own devastating strike on June 4.  By Nasser’s own later
estimate, the probability of war had reached 80% when he initiated his peace offensive.
This is consistent with the antagonists being in a class III game; Nasser, it turned out,
could not beat those odds.
Following Mor (1993), I have tried to show how perceptions of the strategic
situation changed over the course of the 1967 crisis, making war ever more likely as the
perceived game shifted from class I to class II to class III.  When it became a class III
game, Nasser was no longer able to extricate himself from the crisis he had incited and
escalated to higher and higher levels.
Perhaps Nasser was overly bold in escalating to the level he did, but there was
uncertainty surrounding the consequences of all his moves, making precise prediction
impossible.  Although the flurry of diplomatic activity set off just before the war was too
little and too late, both it and the reasonably controlled escalation that preceded it was not
the mark of a reckless leader but, rather, one very much in the throes of a catch-22.
6.  King-of-the-Mountain Games
The four games Brams and Jones (1997) call king-of-the-mountain games are given
in Figure 4a.26  Observe that in each game there is a (3,4) state that C can induce with
________________________________________________________________________
Figures 4a and 4b about here
________________________________________________________________________
moving power and a (4,3) state that R can induce with moving power. While the outcome
predicted by standard game theory is the unique Nash equilibrium of (3,4)—associated
                                          
26The appellation “king of the hill” is also used for these games, which are defined to be
games “in which each person attempts to climb to the top of some point, as a mound of
earth, and to prevent all others from pushing or pulling him off the top” (Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, 1979).28
with the dominant strategy of R and the best response of C—TOM predicts (4,3) as the
outcome if R has moving power.
Instead of giving a new example of a king-of-the-mountain game, and the exercise
of moving power in it, consider the class of mobilization situations that these games seem
best to model.  As depicted in the generic game in Figure 4b, C can choose to mobilize or
not, and R can choose to concede or not.  Not conceding is assumed to be not just
escalating a crisis— as when R might countermobilize—but a strategy that, whatever C
does, is destructive for both players (rank 1 or 2).
On the other hand, if R concedes, the outcomes are good for both players (rank 3 or
4).  Following standard game theory, this game is easy to solve:  R will choose its
dominant strategy of cooperation; anticipating this choice, C will hold out for its
preferred state, resulting in the Nash equilibrium of (3,4).
But if R has moving power, according to TOM, it can force C to stop at (4,3), just
as C can force R to stop at (3,4) if it has moving power.  In other words, which of the
Pareto-optimal outcomes will occur depends on which, if either, player can continue the
move-countermove process when the other player is forced to “throw in the towel.”  The
latter player, it has been argued in game 37, was North Vietnam after repeated bombing
campaigns by the United States in the Vietnam war (Brams, 1994, ch. 4), and Saddam
Hussein after the air and ground attacks by the United States and its allies in the 1990-91
Persian Gulf war (Massoud, 1998).
  These conflicts were rife with misperception and vulnerable to threats as well.27
But, as indicated in section 4, a simple lack of information as to which player has moving
power may well lead to cycling, as each player strives to demonstrate—by continuing the
move-countermove process—that it, in the end, can prevail (i.e., be the “king”).
                                          
27In particular, R can threaten C’s two worst outcomes, assuming it has “threat power”
(Brams, 1994, ch. 5), to try to induce its preferred (4,3) outcome instead of the Nash
equilibrium of (3,4).29
There are some subtle differences in the four games.  Call a move an impediment if
it involves a player’s moving from a better to a worse state, as is the case in all the king-
of-the-mountain games when R moves from the upper right-hand cell to the lower right-
hand cell (i.e., from 3 to either 2 or 1).  In games 36 and 37, this is the only impediment,
making these games moderately cyclic.  In games 33 and 34, by comparison, there is a
second impediment when C moves from the lower right-hand cell to the lower left-hand
cell (i.e., from 2 to 1), making these games weakly cyclic.28
Notice in the king-of-the-mountain games that the players must move through two
states in which the players suffer their worst (1) or next-worst (2) outcomes, which is
never the case in catch-22 games.  These games, in fact, might better model the 1960
Rotem crisis and stage I of the 1967 crisis than do the class I catch-22 games.  In
particular, the fact that Egypt returned to the status quo ante in the 1960 crisis indicates
that it was probably satisfied (rank 3), not dissatisfied (rank 2), by this outcome.
7.  Conclusions
Several empirical instances of both catch-22 and king-of-the-mountain games,
which represent 28% of the 57 2 x 2 conflict games, have previously been studied.29
                                          
28Of the 12 catch-22 games, six are moderately cyclic (38 - 41, 48, and 56) and none is
weakly cyclic; the remaining six games (42 - 47) are strongly cyclic—there are no
impediments—making these games “frictionless.”  It would seem that players would
have the most incentive to cycle in the latter games (all in class III), because a move
always brings a player to an immediately better state.
29While the theoretical percentage says nothing about the empirical relative frequency of
these games, it is worth noting that different catch-22 games have been used to model
conflicts in Brams (1994), including two Bible stories and one theological conundrum.
Moving power is explicitly applied to the analysis of the latter situation, which involves a
putative superior being (with moving power) playing against an ordinary being.  In
international relations, moving power has been used to explain a series of sanctions—
continually imposed, lifted, and reimposed by the United States on Haiti in the 1980s and
early 1990s (Simon, 1996)—and refugee repatriation (Zeager and Bascom, 1996).
Analyses, based on TOM, that make nonmyopic equilibria their building blocks include
Brams (1997) on surprise and Maoz and Mor (1996) on enduring international rivalries.30
Although not as well-known as 2 x 2 symmetric games like Prisoners’ Dilemma,
Chicken, or Stag Hunt, these 16 games nevertheless pose trying choices for the players,
especially when viewed from a theory-of-moves (TOM) perspective.
The specific TOM perspective I offered in this paper is that of cyclic games (36 in
all), in which moves in either a clockwise or a counterclockwise direction never require
that a player move from its best state.  But more than being cyclic, what the 12 catch-22
and 4 king-of-the-mountain games share is that moving power in them, and only in them,
is effective.  That is, a player does better if it possesses moving power than if its opponent
possesses it in 44% of the cyclic games (moving power is irrelevant or ineffective in the
remainder), so there is good reason for each player to try to outlast its opponent in these
games as the players alternately move and countermove around the matrix.
Such cycling can lead to endless frustration on the part of the players,30 but
occasionally they may recognize the futility of cycling and resolve their differences.  This
occurred in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, but not without major outside help:  After
fighting five wars  in 25 years (1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70, and 1973) at great cost to
both sides, Egypt and Israel still required considerable pressure from the United States to
be induced to sign the Camp David accords in 1978, which then paved the way for the
signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
The two crises (1960 and 1967) analyzed here in this long-running historical
conflict smack of being catch-22s.  While the 1960 Rotem crisis did not escalate beyond a
class I Mobilization Game, the 1967 crisis moved in three stages from a class I catch-22
game that mimicked Rotem to a class III game that ended in war.
In 1960, the peaceful resolution occurred when Israel refrained from undertaking a
full-scale countermobilization and Egypt withdrew its forces from the Sinai, as the
Mobilization Game model predicts.  But such a resolution evaded the decision makers in
                                          
30For an alternative analysis of frustration, based on the concepts of nonmyopic
equilibrium and threat power in TOM, see Brams (1997).31
the 1967 crisis as perceptions of the game moved it from a class I to a class II to a class
III catch-22.  Its inexorable moves up the escalatory ladder made countermobilization by
Israel, culminating in a war that nobody wanted—at least in the beginning—inescapable.
Nevertheless, I suggested that decision makers were rational in 1967, given the
informational and other constraints they faced as they tried to escape increasingly more
intractable catch-22s.
The usual explanation for such a conflict spiral, rooted in a static Prisoners’
Dilemma that is intended to model the security dilemma, is unconvincing.  The dynamics
of conflict spirals seem better explained by the rules of TOM, especially those for cyclic
games in which moving power is effective (16 games).  In the 12 catch-22 games,
dissatisfied states have a strong incentive to attempt to implement preferred outcomes.
There is less dissatisfaction, starting at the Nash equilibrium outcome, in king-of-
the-mountain games.  But like catch-22 games, it is unlikely that the situation will simply
“settle down” at this equilibrium as long as C believes it might be able to upset it.   In the
1960 Rotem crisis, which might well be modeled by such a game, Egypt’s attempt
through its mobilization to extract concessions from Israel failed—after a quiet show of
strength by Israel—in large part because Egypt realized that it did not have the
wherewithal to confront Israel at that time.
When a conflict drags on interminably because neither side has moving power,
other parties may intervene to try to bring about a resolution.  Thus, for example, outside
pressure was exerted successfully in the South African conflict, but it has been less
successful so far in other conflicts, including that in Northern Ireland.31  On the other
hand, the intervention of a major UN military force was decisive in inducing the warring
sides in the former Yugoslavia to sign a peace treaty in November 1995, but only after
four years of bitter conflict that cost some 250,000 lives.
                                          
31A TOM analysis of this conflict, based on incomplete information and threat power, is
given in Brams and Togman (1998).32
Like the 1914 crisis, this conflict may well have been fueled by a series of catch-
22s.  To avoid conflict spirals that commence with mobilization decisions, it is important
to recognize that there are different classes of the Mobilization Game.  Mobilizing
intellectual resources to try to head off escalation from a class I to a class II or a class III
game is a critical task for political leaders.33
Figure l
Cyclicity of Two Games
        Noncyclic (Game 22)                    Cyclic (Game 35)
           (4,2)     ¬     (2,l)                       (4,2)     ¬      (2,l)
                       ®
  ¯   ¯ ¯­    ¯
          (3,3)     |¬     (l,4)                      (3,4)      ¬      (l,3)
Key:  (x,y) = (payoff to R, payoff to C)
         4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; l = worst
         Nash equilibria underscored
Unblocked arrows indicate direction of cycling34
Figure 2
Moving Power in Two Cyclic Games
2a.  Moving Power Is Effective in Game 56
          R has moving power                                        C has moving power
           (2,4)    ¬    (4,2)r                            (2,4)    Ü     (4,2)
          ß                 Ý                 ¯                 ­
           (1,1)    ®    (3,3)                                     (1,1)    Þ     (3,3)c
2b.  Moving Power Is Irrelevant in Game 49
         R has moving power                                        C has moving power
           (2,4)    ¬    (4,1)                           (2,4)     Ü    (4,1)
          ß                 Ý                ¯                ­
          (1,2)r    ®    (3,3)                                     (1,2)    Þ    (3,3)c
Key:  (x,y) = (payoff to R, payoff to C)
          4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; l = worst
          Double arrows indicate moves of player with moving power 
Single arrows indicate moves of player without moving power
 r = state that R can induce with moving power
          c = state that C can induce with moving power35
Figure 3
     Generic Mobilization Game and 12 Specific Games It Subsumes
                                               Generic Mobilization Game
                                                                          C
                                        Don’t Mobilize                      Mobilize
           Don’t Mobilize           (x11, y11)             ®           (x12, y12)
    Status quo (SQ)                   Mobilization
                  —C dissatisfied                   by C—crisis
                R                                            ­                       ¯
                    Mobilize             (x21, y21)            ¬            (x22, y22)
                                               Possible                       Countermobilization
                      new SQ           by R—war
Class I:  R and C satisfied (3 or 4) after C’s mobilization—either no movement (stay at c 
state) or backtracking (return to r state).
     38 (51)              39 (52)          40 (53)            41 (54)
(4,2)r   (3,4)c      (4,2)r   (3,4)c      (4,2)r    (3,3)c      (4,2)r   (3,3)c
(1,3)    (2,1)        (2,3)    (1,1)       (1,4)     (2,1)       (2,4)    (1,1)
Class II:  R dissatisfied (2) after C’s mobilization—likely movement to c or r states
     48 (57)             56 (56)
(4,2)r   (2,3)      (4,2)r    (2,3)
(3,4)c   (1,1)      (3,3)c   (1,1)
Class III:  R very dissatisfied (1) after C’s mobilization—very likely movement to c or r states
      42 (73)             43 (74)         44 (75)           45 (76)             46(70)  47(71)
(3,2)r    (1,3)      (4,2)r   (1,3)      (3,2)r    (1,4)      (4,2)r    (1,4)    (4,2)r   (1,3)       (4,2)r   (1,4)
(2,4)c    (4,1)     (2,4)c   (3,1)      (2,3)c    (4,1)      (2,3)c   (3,1)     (3,4)c   (2,1)       (3,3)c   (2,1)
Key:  (x,y) = (payoff to R, payoff to C)
          4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; l = worst
          Nash equilibria underscored
          Arrows indicate direction of the cycling36
r = state that R can induce with moving power
          c = state that C can induce with moving power
Figure 4
4a.  4 King-of-the-Mountain Games
      33 (19)                    34 (20)                36 (49)            37 (50)
(4,3)r      (3,4)c       (4,3)r      (3,4)c      (4,3)r      (3,4)c      (4,3)r    (3,4)c
(2,1)       (1,2)        (1,1)       (2,2)        (1,2)       (2,1)       (2,2)     (1,1)
4b.  Generic King-of-the-Mountain Game
                                                              C
           Do not mobilize                Mobilize
                        I.  R prevails                II.  C prevails
         Concede
                                          (4,3)r          ®             (3,4)c
R                              ­        ¯
                              III.  Bad for both          IV.  Bad for both
        Do not concede
                (1 or 2,1 or 2)    ¬        (1 or 2,1 or 2)
Key:  (x,y) = (payoff to R, payoff to C)
          4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; l = worst
          Nash equilibria underscored
          Arrows indicate direction of the cycling
 r = state that R can induce with moving power
          c = state that C can induce with moving power37
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